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We propose a decoy-state method to overcome the photon-
number-splitting attack for Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum
key distribution protocol in the presence of high loss: A legit-
imate user intentionally and randomly replaces signal pulses
by multi-photon pulses (decoy-states). Then they check the
loss of the decoy-states. If the loss of the decoy-states is ab-
normally less than that of signal pulses, the whole protocol is
aborted. Otherwise, to continue the protocol, they estimate
loss of signal multi-photon pulses based on that of decoy-
states. This estimation can be done with an assumption that
the two losses have similar values, that we justify.
03.67.Dd
Information processing with quantum systems enables
certain tasks that seems to be impossible with its classi-
cal counterparts, e.g. quantum cryptography [1–4], quan-
tum computation [5], and quantum metrologies [6–9]. In
addition to the practical importance, this fact has large
theoretical and even philosophical implications.
Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) Quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD) protocol [2,10] is one of the most promising
quantum information processing. It is expected that it
will be the first practical quantum information processor
[10].
However, a bottleneck in practical realization of QKD
for global secure communications is distance-limit: Im-
plementation of QKD has been successful at order of
tens-kilometers [10]. However, like in classical case, quan-
tum signals are vulnerable to noise or decoherence. For
long-distance QKD, therefore, it is desired that quantum
signals be amplified in the intermediate locations in the
channel. However, due to the no-cloning theorem [11–13],
the task cannot be done in such a simple manner. For-
tunately, however, quantum signals can be transported
even under noisy environments to a remote site by quan-
tum repeaters [14]. However, it is difficult to realize the
quantum repeaters with current technologies. Therefore,
we need to relax the distance-limit in QKD without quan-
tum repeaters. One of the most promising candidate for
this is to use surface-to-satellite free-space BB84 QKD
[15–18]. However, the surface-to-satellite scheme would
suffer high loss. High loss is a serious threat to the BB84
protocol, due to photon number splitting (PNS) attack
[19–23]. Thus there have been a study [21] and a proposal
[24] on how to overcome the PNS attack.
The purpose of this paper is to propose decoy-state
method to overcome the PNS attack for BB84 protocol
in the presence of high loss. This paper is organized
as follows. First we will briefly review how PNS attack
renders the BB 84 protocol with high loss insecure. Next
we decribe the decoy-state method. Next we argue why
we can assume that the loss of decoy-states is similar to
that of other signal pulses. Then we derive a condition
for security of the proposed protocol. Finally we discuss
and conclude.
Let us briefly describe the PNS attack [19–23]. Un-
less perfect single-photon sources are used, BB84 proto-
col with loss is vulnerable to the following attack of Eve
(an eavesdropper). Let us assume that Alice (one legit-
imate participant) uses the following photon sources in
BB84 protocol [2]. Emits a pulse that contains a single-
photon with, for example, 90 % probability, and emits
a pulse that contains multi-photons with 10 % probabil-
ity. The problem here is that multi-photons are inad-
vertantly generated and thus we do not know when they
have been emitted. Also assume that the channel loss
l is, for example, 90 %, or it has 10 % yield y. Here
y = 1 − l and y corresponds to pexp in Ref. [23]. Here
we assume that Bob (the other legitimate participant)
uses more practical detectors that are insensitive to pho-
ton numbers. A more rigorous definition of the yield will
be given later. Eve’s attacking method is the followings.
First, Eve measures the number of photons of each pulse.
When it is one, she just blocks it. When it is more than
one, she splits the photons. (Our discussion here is valid
for general photon sources because ”Alice can dephase
the states to create a mixture of Fock states [22,23]”, as
described later.) Then she preserves one and sends the
other photons via an ideal lossless channel to Bob. As
usual, we assume that Eve has unlimited technological
and computational power. She is only limited by laws
of Nature. Then what Bob observes is that only 10 %
of photon pulses arrive at him, as expected. However,
Eve can get full information about the key by measuring
each of the preserved photons in a proper basis that is
publically announced later by Alice. We adopt the best
case assumption for Eve as usual, that all multi-photon
pulses were used for the PNS attacks. Then we can see
that if the yield y is less than the probability pmulti of
multi-photon generations then the scheme is totally in-
secure due to the PNS attacks. In other words, yield
y must be greater than the probability pmulti of multi-
photon generations in order that the scheme be secure
[23],
y > pmulti. (1)
Here the probability pmulti of multi-photon generations
is a parameter for quality of (imperfect) single-photon
sources. The smaller it is, the higher the quality is. For
a single-photon source with a given quality, the loss that
can be tolerated is determined by Eq. (1).
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Therefore, when yield y is very low, almost perfect sin-
gle photon generator is required [22,23]. This fact mo-
tivated current developements of single-photon sources
and demonstration of QKD with them [25]. However,
the problem is that the sources cannot be perfect single-
photons in practice [26]. In the case of surface-to-surface
free-space BB84 protocol, this condition seems to be
barely satisfied [16]. However, the loss in surface-to-
satellite scheme must be higher than that in the surface-
to-surface scheme, because in the former case one party
is moving fast and more far apart. Moreover, security
of surface-to-satellite protocol in which a satellite plays
a role of a legimate user is based on physical security of
the satellite. That is, we must assume that Eve cannot
secretly observe inside of the satellite. However, it is not
easy to justify the assumption. Thus we propose to use
(possibly geostationary) satellite with mirrors that con-
nect users on the surface. (The refection-protocol has
been proposed in the context of multi-users QKD [18].)
In this case, it is clear that the loss will be much higher.
This means that it is difficult to implement secure scheme
with current technologies.
Thus we need methods to directly detect the PNS at-
tack. One possibility is to monitor photon-number statis-
tics that might have been disturbed by Eve’s PNS attack.
This possibility has been studied in the case of weak co-
herent states [21]; Simple minded PNS attack disturbs
the photon-number statistics of the pulses thus it can be
detected by Bob. However, Eve can launch a sophis-
ticated PNS attack that preserves the photon-number
statistics [21]. Thus we need another method against
the PNS attack.
The basic idea of the decoy-state method is the follow-
ings. In PNS attack, Eve selectively transports subsets
of multi-photons to Bob. Thus the yield of multi-photon
pulses must be abnormally higher than that of single pho-
ton pulses. Let us assume that Alice had intentionally
and randomly replaces photon pulses from signal sources
by multi-photon pulses (the decoy states). Since Eve
cannot distinguish multi-photon pulses of signal source
from those of decoy source, the yields of the two pulses
must be similar. Thus Alice and Bob can detect the PNS
attack by checking the yield of decoy source.
Before we give the decoy-state method, let us de-
scribe preliminaries more precisely. Let us consider a
source that emitts a pulse |n〉 that contains n photons
(in the same polarization state) with a probabity pn.
Here n = 0, 1, 2, ... and
∑
n pn = 1. Each pulse is used
to encode one bit of key. Let us also consider a source
that generates a coherent state |µeiθ〉 [22–24]. By ran-
domizing the phase θ, the state reduces to a mixed state
ρ =
∫
(dθ/2π)|µeiθ〉〈µeiθ |. However, this state is equiva-
lent to mixture of Fock state
∑
n Pn(µ)|n〉〈n|, with Pois-
sonian distribution Pn(µ) = e
−µµn/n!. In other words,
the source that emits pulses in coherent states |µeiθ〉 is,
after phase randomization, equivalent to a source that
emits an n-photon state |n〉 with a probability Pn(µ).
Alice adopts two photon sources, that is, singal source
S and decoy source S′. Signal source is used to dis-
tribute key. Decoy source is used to detect the PNS at-
tack. Let us first consider the most practical case where
both sources are generators of coherent states. For signal
source S, we adopt µ < 1, that is, it mostly emitts single-
photon pulses. For decoy source S′, we adopt µ′ ≥ 1, that
is, it mostly emitts multi-photon pulses. The polariza-
tion of the pulses of the decoy source is randomized such
that it cannot be distingushied from those of the signal
source as long as photon numbers of the pulses are the
same.
We assume that Bob uses practical photon detectors
that are insensitive to photon numbers. The yield yn and
y′n are relative frequencies that n-photon pulses from the
signal and decoy sources are registered by Bob’s detector,
respectively. Here 0 ≤ yn, y
′
n ≤ 1. It is notable that the
yields can be unity even if some photons in a pulse are
lost. It is because Bob’s detector does not count number
of ’lost photons’ in a pulse that is detected. Yield of
signal source Ys and that of the decoy source Yd are,
respectively, given by
Ys =
∑
n
Pn(µ)yn, Yd =
∑
n
Pn(µ
′)y′n. (2)
Here Ys and Yd can be directly detected by Bob. We also
consider yield of only multi-photon pulses from singal
source, Y ms , that is given by,
Y ms =
∞∑
n=2
Pn(µ)yn. (3)
This quantity cannot be directly measured but it can
be bounded based on other yields. Normalized yield of
multi-photon pulses from singal source, Y˜ ms , is given by,
Y˜ ms =
∞∑
n=2
Pn(µ)yn/
∞∑
n=2
Pn(µ). (4)
Now let us describe the protocol more precisely. In the
decoy-state method, Alice performs BB84 protocol with
signal source S. However, Alice randomly replaces the
signal source S by the decoy source S′ with a probability
α. After Bob announces that he has received all photon
pulses, Alice announces which pulses are from the de-
coy source. By public discussion, they estimate the total
yield of signal source Ys and that of decoy source Yd. If
Yd is too larger than Ys, they abort the whole protocol.
Otherwise, they continue the protocol by estimating yield
of multi-photon pulses from singal source, Y ms , using the
yield of decoy source Yd in the following way.
Eve cannot distinguish multi-photon pulses of singal
source from those of decoy source. Thus we can expect
that the normalized yield of multi-photon pulses from
signal source is similar to that of decoy source that mainly
composes of multi-photon pulses. Let us discuss it in
more detail. First, we can see that the yields yn and y
′
n
cannot be different. That is,
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yn = y
′
n. (5)
It is because, for a given pulse with a certain photon
number, Eve can get no more information about which
source the pulse is from, than what she obtains from the
Bayes’s law. The only way for Eve to take advantage of
the Bayes’s law is to control values of yn as she like.
From Eqs. (2) and (5), it is easy to obtain
∞∑
n=2
Pn(µ
′)yn ≤ Yd. (6)
Now the problem is how Y ms =
∑
∞
n=2 Pn(µ)yn is bounded
by Eq. (6). Eve’s goal is to make Y ms as large as possible,
for a given yield of decoy source Yd. In other words, it
is to make the ratio A ≡
∑
∞
n=2 Pn(µ)yn/
∑
∞
n=2 Pn(µ
′)yn
as large as possible. Let us now note that, for µ < µ′ as
we will choose,
Pn(µ)
Pn(µ′)
>
Pm(µ)
Pm(µ′)
, if n < m. (7)
It is because Pn(µ)/Pn(µ
′) =
[e−µµn/n!]/[e−µ
′
(µ′)n/n!] = [e−µ/e−µ
′
][(µ/µ′)n]. We
can see that the ratio A is bounded as,
A =
∑
∞
n=2 Pn(µ)yn∑
∞
n=2 Pn(µ
′)yn
≤
P2(µ)
P2(µ′)
. (8)
It is because P2(µ)/P2(µ
′) −
A = [1/{P2(µ
′)
∑
∞
n=2 Pn(µ
′)yn}][P2(µ)
∑
∞
n=2 Pn(µ
′)yn−
P2(µ
′)
∑
∞
n=2 Pn(µ)yn] =
[1/{P2(µ
′)
∑
∞
n=2 Pn(µ
′)yn}]
∑
∞
n=2 yn{P2(µ)Pn(µ
′) −
P2(µ
′)Pn(µ)} ≥ 0. Here we have used Eq. (7) and
yn, Pn ≥ 0. The equality is achieved when y2 > 0 and
yi = 0, where i = 3, 4, 5, ... .
Thus this is Eve’s best choice. This can be interpreted
as follows. The larger the number of photons of a given
pulse is, the more probable it is that the pulse is from
the decoy source, by the Bayes’s law and the property of
the Poissonian distribution. Eve had better not to make
Bob’s detector register when it is more probable that the
pulse is from the decoy source. Thus Eve’s optimal choice
is to block pulses containing more than 2 photons.
By Eqs. (3), (6) and (8), we can get
Y ms ≤
P2(µ)
P2(µ′)
Yd. (9)
The normalized one, Y˜ ms , is given by,
Y˜ ms ≤
1
P2(µ′)
P2(µ)∑
∞
n=2 Pn(µ)
Yd. (10)
P2(µ
′) and P2(µ)/
∑
∞
n=2 Pn(µ) are of orders of unity in
reasonable regions of µ and µ′, for example, µ = 0.5 and
µ′ = 1. Thus we get the expected result that Y˜ ms and Yd
have the same order of magnitudes.
The condition for security in Eq. (1) expresses
the following. In order that the protocol be secure,
the total number of pulses that are detected must be
greater than that of attacked ones. In the case of the
decoy-state method, the number of attacked pulses is
[
∑
∞
n=2 Pn(µ)]Y˜
m
s . Thus the condition reduces to
Ys > max{[
∞∑
n=2
Pn(µ)]Y˜
m
s }, (11)
where the maximun is taken all strategies by Eve. From
Eqs. (10) and (11), we obtain a condition for security
Ys >
P2(µ)
P2(µ′)
Yd. (12)
Let us roughly estimate the quantities in our case where
both signal and decoy sources are generators of coher-
ent states with Poissonian statistics Pn(µ) and Pn(µ
′) of
photon numbers n, respectively. In normal operations
of the protocol, that is, when Eve does not disturb the
communication, Yd will be larger than Ys by a factor of
µ′/µ. Then the condition reduces to
P2(µ)
P2(µ′)
µ′
µ
=
eµ
′
µ′
µ
eµ
< 1. (13)
For a given µ′, Eq. (13) is satisfied when µ is small
enough, because µ/eµ < µ. For example, when µ = 0.3
and µ′ = 1.0 the lefthand-side of Eq. (13) is around
0.604.
One might say that the mean photon number of signal
source, µ, should still be quite smaller than unity even
with decoy-state method and thus there is no improve-
ment over usual protocols without decoy-state method.
However, this is not the case: Eq. (13) does not contain
a term that amounts to channel loss, in contrast with
the case of Eq. (1). Thus the condition for security can
be satisfied no matter how high the loss is in the normal
opertations.
Our analysis above can be generalized to sources with
any probability distribution pn. For example, let us
consider almost perfect single photon generator with a
particular photon number distribution p1 = 1 − ǫ and
pi = k/i! where ǫ ≪ 1, k is a certain constant satisfying∑
∞
i=2 pi = ǫ, and i = 2, 3, ... . Using the same decoy
source S′, the condition for security in this case is
Ys >
ǫ
P2(µ′)
Yd. (14)
Eq. (14) is satisfied by a large margin when ǫ is small
enough. However, key generation rate would be propor-
tional to the margin. Thus, key generation rate can be
larger than that of the case where weak-coherent-states
are used as signal source.
In general, the more similar forms the photon-number
statistics of the signal source and decoy source have in
a region of multi-photons, the more efficient the decoy-
3
state method is. Let us also consider the following ex-
treme case. Consider an almost-perfect single-photon
generator with a photon number distribution, p1 = 1− ǫ
and pN = ǫ, where ǫ≪ 1 and N is a number quite larger
than 2, for example, 10. In this case, Eve selectively at-
tacks the N photon pulses, making it more difficult to
satisfy the corresponding security condition, if we adopt
the same decoy source S′ with Poissonian distribution
P (µ′). Thus a general stategy in a design of a pair of sig-
nal and decoy sources is to make the forms of the photon
number statistics of the two sources as similar as possible,
in the region of multi-photons.
The proposed method is based on the basic idea of ran-
dom sampling. Thus we believe that the security of the
proposed protocol against the most general attacks can
be shown later, possibly extending methods developed in
recent literatures [27–29].
Conditions for security of protocols with more practical
settings, e.g. non-zero dark count rate and misalignment
of basis, should also be analyzed later.
The only way to address certain imperfection so far is
to assume the best-case for Eve [27–29]. For non-zero er-
ror rates, for example, we assume that it is entirely due to
Eve’s attack. Decoy-state method, however, is an exam-
ple where we can relax this kind of assumptions without
loss security in a proper way. It will be worthwhile to look
for similar ideas that can address other imperfections.
In conclusion, we have proposed a decoy-state method
to overcome the photon-number-splitting attack for
BB84 QKD protocol in the presence of high loss: A legit-
imate user intentionally and randomly replaces the signal
pulses by multi-photon pulses (the decoy states). Then
they check the yield of the decoy-states. If the yield of
the decoy-states is abnormally higher than that of other
signal pulses, the whole protocol is aborted. Otherwise,
to continue the protocol, they estimate yield of signal
multi-photon pulses based on that of decoy-states. This
estimation can be done with an assumption that the two
losses have similar values, that we justified. We have
demonstrated that the estimation can be made indeed
in the pratical case of coherent pulses sources. However,
the analysis can be generalized to arbitrary case.
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